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The doctrine of the Separation of Powers has been called
the second great structural principle of American constitu-
tional law,' and is probably second in importance only to the
doctrine of Federalism which secures the autonomy of the
several States while providing for a strong national govern-
ment at the same time. The doctrine of the Separation of
Powers presumes that there are three instrinsically distinct
functions of government-the legislative, the executive, and
the judicial. It assumes that these three distinct functions
ought to be three separately operated parts of government,
and that each of the three should be constitutionally equal
and mutually independent.
During the period covered by this review, three interesting
cases arose, dealing with the doctrine of the Separation of
Powers. All of these seem properly decided. We have the
Court refusing to assume law-making powers. We have the
Court refusing to interfere in the constitutionally granted
right of the State Senate to judge of the election returns and
qualifications of its own members and finally, we have the
Court preventing members of the legislative branch of the
State Government from assuming powers which constitution-
ally belong to the executive branch of the Government.
In the case of Rogers v. Florence Printing Company2 an
attempt was made to have the Supreme Court reject, as a
matter of public policy, the doctrine of punitive damages.
Notwithstanding that the question had not been raised at the
trial, the Court entertained the plea to the extent of discus-
sing it, stating that it did so because it brought into focus
the function of the Court with respect to the public policy of
the State. Then it proceeded to note that despite criticism
and denunciation of the doctrine, allowance of punitive dam-
*Member of firm of Sinkler, Gibbs & Simons, Charleston; B.A., 1927,
College of Charleston; legal education, 1929, University of South Caro-
lina; member City Council of Charleston, 1939-43; member State Legis-
lature, 1932-36 and 1945-46; member Charleston County, South Carolina
nd American Bar Associations.
1. CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AmERICA, § xiv
(rev. & annot. 1952).
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ages in cases of wilful, wanton or malicious tort had contin-
ued to be the rule in this country for over a century. The
Court noted that the doctrine in South Carolina was recog-
nized as far back as 1784. Refusing to disturb the doctrine,
the Court stated:
(1) But we need dwell no longer about the rationale, or
upon the merits or demerits, of the doctrine. Acquiescence
in it for almost two centuries justifies the conclusion that
it is now agreeable to, and part of, the public policy of
the state.
(2) It is often the function of the courts by their judg-
ments to establish public policy where none on the sub-
ject exists. But overthrow by the courts of existing pub-
lic policy is quite another matter. That its establishment
may have resulted from decisional, rather than statutory
law, is, in our opinion, immaterial. Once firmly rooted,
such policy becomes in effect a rule of conduct or of prop-
erty within the state. In the exercise of proper judicial
self-restraint, the courts should leave it to the people,
through their elected representatives in the General As-
sembly, to say whether or not it should be revised or dis-
carded.
Here is our Court's recognition of its limited sphere under
the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers.
For the third time, the Supreme Court refused, in the
case of Scott v. Thornton,3 to take jurisdiction of a contest to
determine which of two candidates had been elected to the
State Senate of South Carolina. In this case, Scott sought to
review the proceedings of the State Board of Canvassers
which had declared his opponent, Lee, to have been elected as
State Senator from Dillon County in the General Election of
1958. Scott challenged Lee's qualifications to hold office be-
cause of his alleged failure to comply with certain provisions,
prescribed by Section 23-265 of the 1952 Code, as a condition
precedent to the valid election of any candidate.4
3. 234 S. C. 19, 106 S. E. 2d 446 (1959).
4. This section requires each candidate to file with the Clerk of Court
a pledge stating that he would not use money or intoxicating liquors to
influence votes; that he would file with the Clerk of Court prior to the
election an itemized statement of campaign expenditures, and that fol-
lowing the election he would file a further itemized statement showing
moneys spent subsequent to the time of the filing of the first statement.
The statute states that the failure to comply with this provision shall
render the election null and void insofar as the candidate who fails to
file the statement as therein required.
[Vol. 12
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Invoking the provisions of Section 11 of Article III of the
State Constitution, which states that each House of the Gen-
eral Assembly shall judge of the election returns and qualifi-
cations of its own members, the respondents successfully ob-
jected to the jurisdiction of the Court.
Included in the cases relied upon by the Court for it brief
per curiam holding were two previous contests between pee-
sons seeking the office of State Senator. In Ex Parte Scar-
borough,5 the Supreme Court refused to review the action of
the State Canvassers upon the ground that they were Judicial
Officers, at the same time pointing out that a review of their
action lay with the Senate alone. A similar result followed a
contest in 1932, involving the office of State Senator frora
Horry County.
6
To sustain its results, the Court also pointed to the decisiou
in the case of Culbertson v. Blatt.7 In that case a taxpayer
made a blanket challenge against dual office holding by a
member of the House of Representatives, two members of the
State Senate, and a mayor of an incorporated town. The ma-
jority opinion held that under the doctrine of Separation of
Powers, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the questions
raised by the case. The majority opinion also concluded that
a mere taxpayer who showed that no personal or individual
rights were involved, could not entertain the action. The first
ground of the majority holding in the Culbertson case is hig'hy
questionable, for it is established law that when one, who holds
one public office, accepts another public office, he automati-
cally vacates the first public office. Thus, when the House
member and State Senators became Trustees of the University
they were no longer a House member and State Senators.8
Possibly the lack of interest of the plaintiff warrants the re-
sult. But to return to the Scott case, even though it is not
properly sustained by the Culbertson case, the other cases
cited are sound and are supported by the overwhelming
weight of authority throughout the country.
The third case which deals with the doctrine of Separation
of Powers, is the case of Dean v. Timmerman. The question
5. 34 S. C. 13, 12 S. E. 666 (1891).
6. Andersen v. Blackwell, 168 S. C. 137, 167 S. E. 39 (1932).
7. 194 S. C. 105, 9 S. E. 2d 218 (1940).
8. Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer District, 211 S. C. 77, 44
S. E. 2d 88, 173 A. L. R. 397 (1947).
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here was the validity of an Act of the General Assembly
which permitted the Senators and Legislative delegation of
the several counties of the State to assume executive functions
and designate roads which would be hard surfaced under the
State farm-to-market road improvement program. The situ-
ation here was exactly similar to that before the Court twenty
years earlier in the case of Bramlette v. Stringer.10 There,
bonds were authorized for Greenville County to pave county
highways, but the determination of the roads to be paved was
left to the Senator and legislative delegation from Greenville
County. On that basis, the Court invalidated the Greenville
Act basing its holding upon the proposition persons who were
members of the legislative branch of the Government could
not perform executive or administrative functions. The cor-
rectness of the decision here is so free from doubt that little
comment would be required were it not for the fact that the
legislative enactment, which was successfully challenged here,
finds its counterpart in countless other legislative enactments
passed subsequent to the holding of the Bramlette case. In
fact, it seems safe to say, that almost without exception, legis-
lative delegations assume executive and administrative func-
tions in the field of County Government. Apparently, it is only
when bonds are to be issued, that questions arise with respect
to the validity of these enactments. In South Carolina there
is no system by which legislative enactments are reviewed to
determine their constitutionality prior to their presentation
to the Governor for his signature, nor is there any regular
method of review provided before the approved bill is en-
forced. Thus, only in the unusual instances where bonds are
to be issued pursuant to such a law, are challenges of this
sort made.
The absence of regular review to determine the constitu-
tionality of our Statutes is a definite weakness in the func-
tioning of our State Government. There should be a review,
looking to constitutionality, before any bill is presented to the
Governor for signature. Furthermore, there should be a gen-
eral review of all laws by the Attorney General's office before
administrative agencies act in obedience to the directive of
any legislative enactment.
10. 186 S. C. 134, 195 S. E. 257 (1938).
[Vol. 12
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Finally, the members of the Legislature should recognize
the unconstitutionality of statutes devolving administrative
functions upon them, or they should, if they wish to perform
functions in the field of County Government, propose appro-
priate constitutional amendments to allow them to do lawfully
what is now frequently done in defiance of the written Consti-
tution.
Right of the Accused to Counsel
While other interesting questions are involved in the case
of State v. Hollman,1 ' the review here will be limited to the
constitutional right of one under indictment for a crime
alleged to have been committed in violation of State law, to
be represented by counsel. The defendant in this case was
being tried under an indictment containing two counts, viz.:
one, resisting an officer, and two, assault and battery with
intent to kill and murder. He was not represented by counsel
at the trial. The record was stated to show that when the case
was called for trial, his rights were explained to him, where-
upon he stated to the court that he had no lawyer, but would
conduct his own defense. He stated that he was ready for
trial. Only after the close of the testimony, when the trial
judge asked if he desired to argue his case before the jury,
did the appellant request the Court to appoint an attorney
"to make the argument to the jury." The request was refused.
On appeal, the Supreme Court stated that the refusal by
the trial court to grant this request was not error. Our Court
noted that the appellant was given the right under the State
Constitution to be fully heard in his defense by himself or by
his counsel, or both, and went on to say that in South Carolina
there was no constitutional or statutory requirement that the
Court assign counsel for any person accused, except where
the offense charged is a capital one. Then in answer to the
contention that the defendant's rights under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States were violated, the Court had this to say:
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States applies only to trials in federal courts. Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595. If, as
is suggested in the case last cited, refusal to appoint coun-
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sel for the defendant in a criminal case may in certain
circumstances amount to denial of the due process re-
quired by the Fourteenth Amendment, it is manifest that
the facts here warrant no such conclusion,
The statement made by our Supreme Court is literally cor-
rect, but it fails to point up the extent to which the United
States Supreme Court has made itself "counsel for the de-
fense" in a certain class of criminal cases. It might be well to
point this up by quoting more extensively from the Betts de-
cision. The majority opinion contains this language:
The Sixth Amendment of the National Constitution ap-
plies only to trials in federal courts. The due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incor-
porate, as such, the specific guarantees found in the
Sixth Amendment although a denial by a state of rights
or privileges specifically embodied in that and others of
the first eight amendments may, in certain circum-
stances, or in connection with other elements, operate,
in a given case, to deprive a litigant of due process of law
in violation of the Fourteenth. Due process of law is se-
cured against invasion by the Federal Government by the
Fifth Amendment and is safeguarded against state ac-
tion in identical words by the Fourteenth. The phrase for-
mulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those
envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of
the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a matter of rule.
Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the
totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one
setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, may,
in other circumstances, and in the light of other consider-
ations, fall short of such denial. In the application of such
a concept there is always the danger of falling into the
habit of fornulating the guarantee into a set of hard and
fast rules the application of which in a given case may be
to ignore the qualifying factors therein disclosed.
The language is only partially qualified by the majority
holding which stated that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
embody an inexorable command that no trial for any offense
or in any court can be fairly conducted and justice accorded
[Vol. 12
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a defendant who is not represented by counsel. However,
there seems little doubt but that members of the present
United States Supreme Court consider themselves counsel
for the defense in many cases.
It is of interest to note that Hollman did not take the
judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court as final, for
thereafter he brought habeas corpus proceedings in the
United States District Court, raising in that forum, the same
question discussed here. The District Court held that the ac-
tion was not tenable by reason of the well settled rule that,
except under extraordinary circumstances, an application for
habeas corpus will be entertained by a Federal Court only
after ali State remedies available, including all appellate
remedies in the State Courts and in the Supreme Court of the
United States by appeal or writ of certiorari, have been ex-
hausted. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 12 af-
firmed the ruling of the United States District Court, saying
that there were no special circumstances in this case which
would form a basis for departing from the general rule re-
quiring the exhaustion of State remedies before applying to
a Federal Court for a writ of habeas corpus. But it went on to
comment that the opinion by Justice Legge in the case under
review was in harmony with the rule promulgated by the
United States Supreme Court.
The extent to which that Court will intervene is illustrated
in the case of Moore v. State of Michigan.'3 In that case by
a five to four decision the United States Supreme Court in
1957 upset a 1938 sentence on the petition of the criminal,
contending that the lack of counsel had deprived him of his
Constitutional rights, notwithstanding that the Judge who
imposed the sentence was dead and the prosecuting attorney
had suffered a stroke rendering him incapable of testifying,
and the contentions of the Petitioner were sharply challenged
by the only living persons who recalled the circumstances of
the case. Certiorari had been granted upon the ground that
the accused did not have the benefit of counsel.
12. Hollman v. Manning, 262 F. 2d 656 (1959).
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Power of the State Under the Twenty-First
Amendment to Regulate Transportation of Liquor
The facts in the case of State v. Kilgore14 make it crystal
clear that the whiskey which the defendant had purchased
in North Carolina and had in his possession in South Caro-
lina was not whiskey which was in the process of being trans-
ported in Interstate Commerce. Hence, clearly he violated the
South Carolina law which makes the possession of alcoholic
beverages, on which the South Carolina revenue stamp tax
was not paid, a criminal offense. The Court in its decision
notes that since the adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment
to the United States Constitution, each State has power un-
fettered by the Commerce clause, to regulate or prohibit the
importation of intoxicating liquor for delivery or use within
its borders, but it goes on to say that independently of the
Twenty-first Amendment a State might, without offending
the Commerce clause, impose reasonable regulations with re-
gard to the transportation of intoxicating liquor through its
territory from one neighboring State to another. In other
words, the statement indicates that the right to regulate Inter-
state transportation is dependent upon the Commerce clause
and not the Twenty-first Amendment.
The interesting question of the extent to which a State may
regulate "through" shipments of liquor-that is, liquor pur-
chased in one State, transported through the second State,
for delivery in the third State-is to some degree in a state
of flux. Shortly after the ratification of the Twenty-first
Amendment, there were holdings such as Ziffrin, Inc. v.
Reeves1" in which an unanimous Court held that the Twenty-
first Amendment sanctioned the right of a State to legislate
concerning intoxicating liquors brought from without, un-
fettered by the Commerce clause. In that opinion, Justice
MacReynolds said that without a doubt a State may abso-
lutely prohibit the manufacture of intoxicants, their transpor-
tation, sale or possession, irrespective of when or where pro-
duced or obtained.., further, she may adopt measures rea-
sonably appropriate to effectuate these prohibitions and exer-
cise full police authority in respect of them. However, in more
14. 233 S. C. 6, 103 S. E. 2d 321 (1958). 358 U. S. 826 (1958).
15. 308 U. S. 132 (1939).
[Vol. 12
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recent decisions, notably Duckworth v. Arkansas16 and Carter
v. Virginia,7 the majority of the Supreme Court seemed to
doubt if it was the intent of the Twenty-first Amendment to
enable States to prohibit Interstate shipments of alcoholic
beverages across the States. But in the latter case, Justice
Frankfurter, in concurring in the result, rested his decision
on the Twenty-first Amendment and noted the absolute power
given to the States which had been enjoined in the earlier de-
cisions.
Finally, there must be observed the disposition made by the
Supreme Court in Gordon v. State of Texas.'8 The opinion is
as follows:
Per curiam the judgment is affirmed. Twenty First
Amendment to the United States. Carter v. Virginia...
Thus, is the question preserved for future answer, for not-
withstanding that a petition for certiorari in the case here
reviewed was denied, the facts of this case are so clear that
under no circumstances would any question relating to inter-
state transportation of intoxicating liquor properly arise.
Limitation Upon Legislative Log-Rolling
Among the innovations contained in the modern State Con-
stitution, are prohibitions against legislative log-rolling. In
the South Carolina Constitution this provision is expressed in
Section 17 of Article III, which requires that every Act shall
relate to but one subject and that shall be expressed in the
title. The opinion in the case of Colonial Life Insurance Co-
pany v. South Carolina Tax Commission'9 clearly shows the
"great liberality" with which Courts have construed this
provision in their studied effort not to embarrass or obstruct
needed legislation.
Yet our Court has not hesitated to give full recognition to
the purpose of this constitutional provision. In almost each
case it notes that it was intended to prevent hodge-podge or
log-rolling legislation, and to prevent surprise or fraud upon
the Legislature by means of bills as to which the title give
no indication as to their contents and which therefore might
be overlooked both by the Legislature and the observant citi-
16. 314 U. S. 390, 138 A. L. R. 1144 (1941).
17. 321 U. S. 131 (1944).
18. 355 U. S. 369; reh. den. 355 U. S. 967 (1958).
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zen. Notwithstanding such pious expressions, the Court has
hesitated to implement the clear intent of this type of pro-
vision. As a consequence, there has grown up in South Caro-
lina in the last decade or so, the practice of using the State
Appropriation Bill as a vehicle to enact permanent legisla-
tion in almost every field. These bills have in fact assumed
the omnibus characteristics which the constitutional provision
was intended to prevent. Legislation thus enacted has gen-
erally been upheld because of its effect upon, or relation to
State revenues. On this basis, permanent legislation making
provision for the issuance of "special fund" State Bonds for
whose payment certain revenues, together with the faith and
credit of the State have been pledged, has been upheld.
In the case under review, there was enacted as permanent
legislation, but incorporated into the 1951 Annual State Ap-
propriation Bill, a license tax relating to insurance companies,
but the title, though lengthy, failed to make specific reference
to the license tax under challenge in this litigation. On that
basis, the Court held that the enactment was invalid as viola-
tive of the portion of Section 17, Article III, which required
that the subject of the law be expressed in the title. In so
holding, the Court in effect approved the practice of the om-
nibus bill, but merely required the legislative draftsmen to
amplify the title of State Appropriation Bills. Thus, the title
of the State Appropriation Bills must indeed become a com-
plete index to the contents of the legislation.
Notwithstanding the convenience of the omnibus bill, the
fact remains that Section 17 of Article III intended to put
an end to that method of statutory enactment. The result in
this case is a step in the right direction, and it might lessen
the tendency to use the omnibus bill. Nevertheless, the basic
evil remains to be effectively dealt with.
An interesting sidelight to this case is the ultimate disposi-
tion of the legislative enactment. Long prior to this suit the
Code Commissioners inserted the provisions in the 1952 Code.
Such action on their part effectively validated the legislation
notwithstanding its original invalidity by reason of the in-
adequacy of its title. The Court's holding on this point is
amply sustained by previous authorities.
[Vol. 12
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Validity of Special Acts
Inasmuch as there are not less than 100 cases in which the
South Carolina Supreme Court has been called upon since
1895 to determine if an enactment of the General Assembly
is a special law of a sort prohibited by Section 34, Subdivision
IX of Article 3 of the State Constitution, it would be unusual
if any review of the Courts' holdings in the field of constitu-
tional law during any given year did not include comment
upon an opinion involving such legislation. In the case of
Elliott v. Sligh 0 the Court was required to pass upon a statute
making it a criminal offense to use, sell or possess fireworks
in any county containing a municipality having a population
of over 65,000 inhabitants according to the last official United
States census. In other words, the law would have been ap-
plicable to Charleston County and Richland County, but to
no others. The Court, while recognizing that classification of
counties is permitted, noted that such classification must be
based on a rational difference of situation or condition found
in the counties, and that the basis of classification must have
some reasonable relation to the purposes and objects sought
to be obtained by the legislation. It found that in this case
there were no differences between the conditions in the rural
areas of Charleston and Richland Counties from those exist-
ing in adjoining counties, which would justify the legislation,
and on that basis it held that the classification was not
rational, and the Statute unconstitutional. The result here
seems entirely correct. One comment might be made. Because
of the great number of decisions involving the validity of
special acts, no absolute and clear-cut pattern which would re-
sult in the harmonizing of all the decisions, is possible. The
constant litigation on the subject is indicative that the Bar
does not recognize a clear pattern. Nevertheless, the decision
in the case of Mills Mill v. Hawkins2 1 points up the fact that
at least in the field of local finance, a definite pattern has
emerged under which local acts relating to public finance will
be upheld. The case here seems to emphasize that a similar
pattern has emerged insofar as criminal statutes are con-
cerned. Almost without exception statutes of this sort will be
stricken unless there is a clear and logical classification to
20. 233 S. C. 161, 103 S. E. 2d 923 (1958).
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sustain the restricted field in which the statute is intended
to operate. The result here is salutary. Special legislation in
the field of public finance is logical. However, the converse
is certainly true in the field of criminal law.
It is interesting to recall that the very first challenge to
the validity of a special enactment which was made following
the adoption of the Constitution of 1895 was a case making it
a criminal offense to fish (for profit) in the counties of Colle-
ton and Berkeley without obtaining a license.22 The Court
quickly declared the enactment invalid.
Scope of Review of Orders Issued by South Carolina
Public Service Commission
The holding in the case of Long Motor Lines, Inc. v. South
Carolina Public Service Commission" does not disturb the
settled rule that the order of a Commission made pursuant to
legislative authority in the exercises of the police powers of
the State is subject to correction only insofar as it might be
held as a matter of law to embody arbitrary or capricious ac-
tion. Orders of such a Commission are presumptively just,
and findings of fact of such bodies are deemed to be correct,
at least prima facie. However, the principal basis of the Ap-
pellant's contention in this case was that the failure of the
administrative agency, to make specific findings, circum-
vented Court review even in the light of those accepted prin-
ciples. The Supreme Court avoided the question on the ground
that the respondents failed to raise this question before the
trial judge. Disposition of the case on this ground is debat-
able. Fortunately, however, the Court noted that better prac-
tice requires the Commission to make specific findings of fact
before taking action. It seems to the writer here that unless
the Commission made specific findings in the light of the rec-
ord made before it, the Appellate Court would not be in a
position to make a review of the Commission's action in order
to determine if the aggrieved party had been treated in arbi-
trary or capricious fashion. It would thus seem that Appellate
Court review and relief would be required unless there were
findings of fact based upon the record upon which the action
of the Commission was predicated. Presumably, in the light of
22. State v. Higgins, 51 S. C. 51, 28 S. E. 15 (1897).
23. 233 S. C. 67, 103 S. E. 2d 762 (1958).
[Vol. 12
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this warning, State Commissions will undertake findings of
fact in order to enable the reviewing Court to determine if
their final action has a proper standing. The reviewing Court
should not hesitate to grant relief if the record discloses no
credible evidence upon which the administrative agency's
action is predicated.
Unsuccessful Candidate In Primary Election Not
Disqualified In Following General Election
While the case of Scott v. Thornton, supra, illustrates the
rule that the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to
pass upon contests relating to seats in the General Assembly,
Redfearn v. Board of State Canvassers24 illustrates that the
contrary is true in contests relating to other offices. The right
of review on a writ of certiorari is clear.
The constitutional question in this case arose on the con-
tention of Redfearn that his opponent was not eligible to op-
pose him in the General Election because she had made the
pledge prescribed by the Code,25 "to abide by the results of
the primary and to support in the next General Election all
candidates nominated in said primary." Redfearn had been
successful in the primary and his principal opponent in the
General Election had been his unsuccessful opponent in the
primary. In passing upon this question the Court made this
statement:
We are not here concerned with whether Mrs. Pusser's
position, as a 'write-in' candidate in the general election,
should or should not be considered as morally or ethic-
ally improper. Our function is to determine her eligibility
as a matter of law.
Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of 1895 declares
that 'every inhabitant of this State possessing the quali-
fications provided in this Constitution shall have an equal
right to elect officers and to be elected to fill public of-
fice.' That Mrs. Pusser possessed the qualifications pre-
scribed by the Constitution is not questioned.
It then proceeded to hold that it was unnecessary to decide
whether the Legislature may impose qualifications or dis-
qualifications, other than those prescribed by the Constitu-
24. 234 S. C. 118, 107 S. E. 2d 10 (1959).
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tion, for election to the particular office in controversy. It
held that the code section prescribing the pledge did not im-
pose such a qualification. The disposition of this question
seems correct. The same reasoning was applied to Redfearn's
further contention that those who voted for him in the pri-
mary and who had taken the oath contemplated by the code
to support the nominees of the primary, were also disquali-
fied.
Freedom to Contract
The Plaintiff in the case of Batchelor v. American Health
Insurance Company26 was obviously easy prey to insurance
salesmen. Notwithstanding that he had "take home" pay of
only $53 per week, the record shows that he had some ten poli-
cies besides the one involved in this litigation entitling him to
weekly benefits, plus medical and hospital charges. Having
suffered an accident, presumably covered by the policy here,
Batchelor brought suit. His claim was resisted on the theory
that the large number of policies which he had procured had
the effect of constituting the policy in litigation a "wagering"
policy and void as against public policy. One can hold little
sympathy for the Insurance Company here in view of the
testimony which shows that when approached by the agent
of the defendant he tried to resist his blandishments because
he did not need any insurance. To this the agent replied that
one could never have too much insurance.
Noting that the freedom to contract was not unlimited
where public safety and morals were involved, and that in
such instances the law-making branch of the government
might impose limitations upon the right to contract, the Court
properly held that the case here did not fall in that category,
noting that the General Assembly had not established a pub-
lic policy preventing one from purchasing as many hospital
expense policies as one might desire. Other questions in this
case are not germane to the scope of the review.
Sufficiency of Ballot Proposing Constitutional Amendment
Section I of Article XVI prescribes the method of adding
amendments to the Constitution of South Carolina. The first
step required is the adoption, by each of the two Houses of
26. 234 S. C. 103, 107 S. E. 2d 36 (1959).
[Vol. 12 •
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the General Assembly, of a resolution proposing the amend-
ment. Following the adoption of the resolution in the manner
prescribed in this section of the Constitution, the question of
adoption of the amendment is submitted to the qualified elec-
tors of the State at the next General Election thereafter held.
If the vote in such election is favorable, the amendment be-
comes a part of the Constitution if each branch of the Gen-
eral Assembly following the election, ratifies the same. Thus
it is to be seen that the expression of the electorate is a vital
part in the amending process of the State Constitution.
In the case of Lowery v. Shirley,27 the question for decision
was whether the question employed to obtain the required ex-
pression of the electorate was misleading. The necessity for
questions to be fairly submitted is readily apparent, and our
Court has on occasion condemned the result where the ques-
tion was so phrased as to be capable of misleading the
voters.2 1 The question employed in the case under review
read:
Shall Section 5, Article X of the Constitution of this State
be amended so as to provide a limitation upon the bonded
indebtedness of Oconee County and to authorize Oconee
County to incur bonded indebtedness to an amount not
exceeding fifteen per cent of the assessed value of the
taxable property in the county?
The contention was that the phraseology employed could
have misled the voters into believing that the amendment
would impose and not relax a limitation upon the County's
power to incur bonded indebtedness. The Court concluded
that taken as a whole the amendment fairly informed the
electorate, but it noted that the phraseology "to provide a
limitation upon the bonded indebtedness of Oconee County"
was not necessary and that had it stood alone it would have
been misleading. Notwithstanding, the Court concluded that
the question as a whole did not have the effect of misleading
the electorate, and as a consequence, concluded that the amend-
ment had received the required approval of the electorate.
27. 234 S. C. 279, 107 S. E. 2d 769 (1959).
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